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Abstract. In the implementation of device-independent quantum key distribution
we are interested in maximizing the key rate, i.e. the number of key bits that can
be obtained per signal, for a fixed security parameter. In the finite size regime, we
furthermore also care about the minimum number of signals required before key can
be obtained at all. Here, we perform a fully finite size analysis of device independent
protocols using the CHSH inequality both for collective and coherent attacks. For
coherent attacks, we sharpen the results recently derived in Arnon-Friedman et al.,
Nat. Commun. 9, 459 (2018) [1], to reduce the minimum number of signals before key
can be obtained. In the regime of collective attacks, where the devices are restricted
to have no memory, we employ two different techniques that exploit this restriction
to further reduce the number of signals. We then discuss experimental platforms in
which DIQKD may be implemented. We analyse Bell violations and expected QBER
achieved in previous Bell tests with distant setups and situate these parameters in the
security analysis. Moreover, focusing on one of the experimental platforms, namely
nitrogen-vacancy based systems, we describe experimental improvements that can lead
to a device-independent quantum key distribution implementation in the near future.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2,3] is a remarkable example of the advantages that
quantum systems bring to accomplishing classical tasks. All the classical crypto-systems
used for key exchange are based on computational assumptions and, therefore, are
susceptible to retroactive attacks. Indeed, if an adversary keeps track of the public
information exchanged during the communication of an encrypted message and, in a
later future, a more efficient algorithm or faster machines become available, then the
messages exchanged in the past can be decrypted. The novelties brought by quantum
systems allow two parties to establish a common key that is information-theoretically
secure and, therefore, can be used to achieve perfect secure communication with a one-
time pad encryption.
Quantum key distribution schemes explore intrinsic properties of quantum systems,
such as no-cloning [4, 5] and monogamy of entanglement [6], in order to achieve
security even against an all powerful adversary who has unlimited computational power.
The well known quantum key distribution scheme BB84 [2] can tolerate a reasonable
amount of noise and decent rates‡ can be achieved with current technology, see for
example the analyses of [9–11]. BB84-based QKD has been successfully implemented
over long distances, see for example [12, 13], and even satellite-based secure quantum
communication was established [14].
A successful implementation of the BB84 protocol is, however, highly dependent
on a good characterisation of the underlying quantum system and the measurement
devices. For example, the protocol can easily be broken if the devices are performing
measurements in four dimensional systems instead of qubits, see discussions in
[15, 16]. Furthermore, hacking of existent implementations that exploit experimental
imperfections were presented (see e.g. [17–20]).
A good characterization of the experimental setup is a strong assumption. What
is more, when quantum technologies become commercially available, we might often
buy devices from a provider which is not entirely trustworthy. Fortunately, quantum
properties allow us to overcome this problem: By exploring the strong correlations that
arise in quantum systems, one can prove security of quantum key distribution even in
the very adversarial scenario where Alice and Bob do not have complete knowledge of
the internal working of their measurement devices or the underlying quantum system
that they are measuring [1, 16, 21–34]. This is the device-independent (DI) model.
‡ Due to finite size effects a minimal number of rounds is required in order to guarantee security. For
the BB84 protocol this minimal number of rounds required is ∼ 104. Moreover, a quantum bit error
rate (QBER) of up to 20% can be tolerated [7, 8] for large enough number of rounds.
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1.2. The device-independent scenario
The device-independent scenario models the underlying system and measurement
devices as black boxes where the only relevant information is the statistics of inputs
and outputs. Therefore, no assumptions on the dimension of the quantum systems or
the particular measurements performed by the devices are required. This represents
a significant relaxation of the assumptions present in an implementation of the BB84
protocol. However, it is important to remark which assumptions remain present in any
implementation of a DI protocol.
Assumptions 1 (Device-independent model). In the device-independent model we
assume:
(i) Isolated labs: no information is leaked from or enters Alice’s and Bob’s labs,
apart from the state distribution before the measurements and the public classical
information dictated by the protocol.
(ii) Isolated source: the preparation of states is independent of the measurements.
(iii) Trusted classical post-processing: all the public classical communication is
performed using an authenticated channel and the local classical computations are
trusted.
(iv) Trusted Random Number Generators: Alice and Bob possess independent and
trusted random number generators.
A bit of thought can make one conclude that completely removing any of these
assumptions leads to a strategy where the key is leaked to the adversary. However,
we remark that partial relaxation of these assumptions can still be considered. In
Ref. [35], QKD is proved to achieve everlasting security by relaxing Assumption 1(iii)
to a computationally secure authenticated channel, but assuming the eavesdropper to
be computationally bounded during the execution of the protocol. In many device
independent protocols, instead of Assumption 1(ii), it is assumed that all the n systems
are prepared before the measurement phase starts, so that no information other than the
classical public communication is exchanged during the protocol. However, this would
require quantum memory from Alice and Bob in order to store the quantum states
along the protocol. In an implementation where the quantum states are generated
round by round, and therefore in which no long term quantum memory is required,
Assumption 1(ii) is necessary to avoid that the state prepared by the source leaks the
raw bits generated by Alice’s device in the previous round. Indeed, if the source is
arbitrarily correlated with the measurement devices the state prepared can contain an
additional degree of freedom that encodes the string of bits generated in the previous
rounds (this strategy is detailed in [36, Appendix C]). We remark that, in experimental
platforms, the preparation of states and the measurements are either performed within
the same systems or optically connected ones, and therefore one needs to assume that the
process of generating a quantum state is not correlated with the previously performed
measurements. This assumption is, however, often well justified based on a description
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of the setup. Ref. [41] addresses the problem of hidden memory in the devices. The
authors show that a malicious eavesdropper can program the measurement devices in
such a way that information about a previously generated key may be leaked through the
public communication of a subsequent run of the key generation protocol, if the devices
are re-used. Ref. [42] proposes an alternative to overcome memory attacks and covert
channels in general, as well as the need to assume that all the classical post-processing is
trusted. By introducing protocols based on secure multi-party computation distributed
among more devices, ref. [42] relaxes the black-box model to reliability of only one of
the quantum devices. Moreover, the classical post-processing can tolerate up to a third
of malicious classical devices.
Another assumption that is often used in security proofs is that the rounds of the
experiment are independent and identically distributed (IID). This, in particular, implies
that the measurement devices are memoryless and the state shared by Alice and Bob
is the same for every round on the protocol. The IID assumption can be justified, for
example, in experimental setups where Alice and Bob control to some extent the source
and measurement devices, but do not have a full characterization of their working.
Assumptions 2 (IID assumption). An IID implementation assumes:
• IID devices: the devices behave independently and in the same way in every round
of the protocol.
• IID states: The state distributed is the same for every round of the protocol. In
summary, the state of the n rounds can be written as ρAn1Bn1E = ρ
⊗n
ABE.
The eavesdropper attacks in QKD are classified in three types: Individual attacks,
where the eavesdropper has no memory and therefore is restricted to attack individually
each round of the protocol; Collective attacks: where in every round the systems
of Alice and Bob, as well as the measurement devices, are prepared identically but
the eavesdropper is allowed to make arbitrary global operations on her quantum
side information; and Coherent attacks: additionally to the global operations the
eavesdropper can perform in her quantum side information, the states shared by Alice
and Bob in each round can be arbitrarily correlated, as well as the measurement
devices in the DI scenario can have memory and operate according to the results of
previous rounds, i.e., do not satisfy the IID assumption. The IID assumption, stated
in Assumptions 2, corresponds to the scenario where the eavesdropper is restricted to
collective attacks. In what follows we focus on two types of adversarial attacks: collective
attacks and coherent attacks.
1.3. Device-independent quantum key distribution protocols
The first ideas of device-independent QKD arose in the E91 protocol [3], which uses a
test of the CHSH inequality [37] in order to certify that Alice and Bob share a maximally
entangled state. This idea of self-testing quantum devices was further explored in [15].
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Indeed, device-independent quantum key distribution relies on the violation of a Bell
inequality in order to certify the security of the generated key. The simplest DIQKD
protocol uses the CHSH inequality for the security test:
β = 〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉 ≤ 2, (1)
where 〈AxBy〉 = p(a = b|xy) − p(a 6= b|xy) represents the correlation of the outputs
a, b of Alice and Bob when they perform the measurement labeled by x, y respectively.
The CHSH inequality can be phrased as a game [38] in which Alice and Bob receive
x and y, respectively, as inputs and the winning condition is that their outputs satisfy
a+ b = x · y, with the operations +, · taken modulo 2. The winning probability ω of the
CHSH game relates to the violation β by
ω =
4 + β
8
. (2)
For DIQKD based on the CHSH inequality, we consider protocols where Alice
possesses a device with two possible inputs X ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has a device with three
possible inputs Y ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The inputs X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1} are used to test
for the CHSH inequality, and the inputs X = 0 and Y = 2 are used for the other
rounds, often called key generation rounds, where maximal correlation of the outputs
is expected. The parameters of interest are the Bell violation β, or winning probability
ω, achieved in the test rounds and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q of the key
generation rounds. We consider that an implementation of the protocol is expected
to have n rounds and a portion γn of these rounds is used for testing of the CHSH
condition.
A DIQKD protocol can be divided in three phases:
• An initial phase where Alice and Bob use their respective devices to measure the
quantum systems and, according to the obtained outputs, generate the n-bit strings
An1 and B
n
1 .
• A second phase where Alice and Bob publicly exchange classical information in
order to perform error correction, to correct their respective strings generating
the raw keys; and parameter estimation, to estimate the parameters of interest
(Bell violation, β, and QBER, Q). At the end of this phase Alice and Bob are
supposed to share equal n-bit strings and have an estimate of how much knowledge
an eavesdropper might have about their raw key.
• In the final phase, Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification, where the not fully
secure n-bit strings are mapped into smaller strings KA and KB, which represents
the final keys of Alice and Bob respectively.
The specific protocols we consider for our analyses are detailed in Section 2, (see
Protocol 1 and Protocol 2).
In order to define security of a DIQKD protocol, we follow Refs. [1, 39] and adopt
the security definition that is universally composable for standard QKD protocols [40].
Universal composability is the statement that a protocol remains secure even if it is
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used arbitrarily in composition with other protocols. It is important to remark that,
for the device-independent case, attacks proposed in Ref. [41] show that composability
is not achieved if the same devices are re-used for generation of a subsequent key.
Indeed, in [41], the authors have shown that a malicious eavesdropper can program
the measurement devices in such a way that information about a previously generated
key may be leaked through the public communication of a subsequent run of the key
generation protocol, if the devices are re-used. It is still an open problem what is the
minimum set of assumptions that can lead to universal composability of DIQKD (e.g.
the attacks of Ref. [41] can be avoided if we assume that Alice and Bob have sufficient
control over the existing internal memory of their devices, so that they can re-set it after
an execution of the protocol).
Let KA and KB denote the final key held by Alice and Bob, respectively, after they
perform a DIQKD protocol. A DIQKD protocol is secure if it is correct and secret.
Correctness is the statement that Alice and Bob share the same key at the end of the
protocol, i.e., KA = KB. Secrecy is the statement that the eavesdropper is totally
ignorant about the final key.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A DIQKD protocol is corr-correct if the probability that
the final key of Alice, KA, differs from the final key of Bob, KB, is smaller than corr,
i.e.
P (KA 6= KB) ≤ corr. (3)
Definition 2 (Secrecy). Let Ω denote the event of not aborting in a DIQKD protocol
and p(Ω) be the probability of the event Ω. The protocol is sec-secret if, for every initial
state ρABE it holds that
p(Ω) · 1
2
‖ρKAE |Ω − τKA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ sec, (4)
where τKA =
1
|KA|
∑
k |k〉〈k|A is the maximally mixed state in the space of strings KA,
and ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm.
If a protocol is corr-correct and sec-secret, then it is 
s
DIQKD-correct-and-secret for
any sDIQKD ≥ corr + sec. See Section 4.2 for a more detailed definition of security of a
DIQKD protocol.
Given an DIQKD protocol that has n rounds and generates a final correct-and-
secret key of l bits, then the secret key rate is defined as
r =
l
n
. (5)
Our goal is to derive the secret key rate as a function of the parameters of interest, β
and Q, that Alice and Bob can estimate during the execution of the protocol.
1.4. Security proof of DIQKD
Even though the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme dates back to 1984 [2], the
formal security proof in the asymptotic regime only came out more than a decade later,
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see e.g. [43–46]. Security in the composable paradigm in the finite regime against general
coherent attacks was only formalized in 2005 [47–49]. Moreover, a finite key analysis
without the IID assumption over the state preparation and with parameters compatible
with current technology only came in 2012 [9, 10].
In the device-independent scenario, security against a quantum eavesdropper§
restricted to collective attacks was first proved in [16,27]. A proof against general attacks
assuming memoryless devices was presented in [28, 29]. The problem of extending the
security proofs to coherent attacks in the device-independent scenario remained open
for a long time. One of the main difficulties is that de Finetti techniques [48,51], used to
extend security proofs against collective attacks to general coherent attacks in standard
QKD, are not applicable in the DI scenario. A series of recent works [31–34] culminated
in the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) [1] (see [39, 52] for extended versions).
The EAT allows one to extend the analysis against collective attacks to the fully device-
independent scenario, resulting in asymptotically tight security proofs and high rates in
the finite size regime.
1.5. Experimental DIQKD
Protocols for DIQKD rely on a Bell test between two distant parties [16]. In order to
certify security, this Bell test should be free of loopholes that could be exploited by an
adversary. While closing the detection loophole is crucial for a DIQKD implementation,
the spacelike separation required for loophole-free Bell tests can be relaxed. In a DIQKD
experiment, no-communication between the devices does not have to be guaranteed by
spacelike separation, since the assumption of isolated labs, Assumption 1(i), is already
needed to ensure that the generated key is not leaked to the eavesdropper at any
point in time. We are thus interested in considering Bell violations between distant
- albeit not necessarily spacelike separated - setups in which the detection-loophole is
closed [53–60]. The recent performance of fully loophole-free Bell tests [53–56] mark
technological progress towards Bell tests without detection loophole over increasingly
distant setups, as needed for practically useful DIQKD.
Despite the experimental progress, a device-independent quantum key distribution
protocol has not yet been performed. The reason for this is that a Bell violation alone
is not enough to guarantee security in a DIQKD protocol. One also needs to account
for the amount of information leaked during the error correction, when Alice and Bob
correct their string of bits in order to achieve a perfectly correlated raw key. The amount
of information required for error correction is determined by the QBER. With a finite
QBER, as in practical systems, a large Bell violation is needed to achieve a positive
key rate. Moreover, a high minimal number of rounds is required for security due to
finite-size effects. The large number of necessary rounds requires a significantly high
entangling rate. Altogether, DIQKD demands a low QBER, high Bell violation and
§ A discussion on earlier security proofs that do not restrict the eavesdropper to the quantum formalism
can be found in [50].
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high entangling rates. Even though some systems satisfy parts of these requirements,
e.g. a high Bell violation [53,56,59,60] or high entangling rate [54,55,57,58], so far there
are no systems that combine all requirements. In section 2.3 we describe the potential
platforms for an experimental implementation of DIQKD in detail.
2. Results
We now present our results. In Section 2.1, we establish the key rates for DIQKD
protocols based on the CHSH inequality, both for coherent and collective attacks in
the finite size regime. As a benchmark, in Section 2.2, we compare the key rates
that can be achieved in the finite regime for the two adversarial scenarios (collective
and coherent attacks) using an implementation with depolarizing noise. In Section
2.3, we discuss the state of the art of experimental implementations. We estimate the
parameters of interest for previously performed Bell experiments and situate them in the
security proofs. Additionally, focusing on Nitrogen-vacancy based systems we indicate
experimental improvements that can lead to an implementation of DIQKD in the near
future. Throughout this manuscript we use Log10 to denote logarithm to base 10 and
log to denote logarithm to base 2.
2.1. Key Rates
In the following, we derive the key rates in the finite size regime for DIQKD protocols
where the CHSH inequality is used for certifying security. For coherent attacks we
sharpen the results recently derived in [1]. For collective attacks we perform the
analysis by employing two techniques: the finite version of the asymptotic equipartition
property [61] and the additivity of the 2-Re´nyi entropy.
2.1.1. Key rates for coherent attacks. In order to analyze the key rates against general
coherent attacks we use the recently developed entropy accumulation theorem (EAT)
[1,39,52] and consider the following protocol.
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Protocol 1 DIQKD Protocol for coherent attacks [39]
1: for For every block j ∈ [m] do
2: Set i = 0 and Cj = ⊥.
3: while i ≤ smax do
4: Set i = i+ 1.
5: Alice and Bob choose a random bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that P (Ti = 1) = γ.
6: if Ti = 0 then Alice and Bob choose inputs (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2).
7: else they choose Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1} (the observables for the CHSH test).
8: end if
9: Alice and Bob use their devices with the respective inputs and record their
outputs, Ai and Bi respectively.
10: If Ti = 1 they set i = smax + 1.
11: end while
12: end for
13: Error Correction: Alice and Bob apply the error correction protocol EC,
communicating script OEC in the process. If EC aborts they abort the protocol,
else they obtain raw keys A˜n1 and B˜
n
1 .
14: Parameter estimation: Using Bn1 and B˜
n
1 , Bob sets
Ci =

1, if Ti = 1 and Ai ⊕Bi = Xi · Yi
0, if Ti = 1 and Ai ⊕Bi 6= Xi · Yi
⊥, if Ti = 0
(6)
He aborts if∑
j
Cj < m× (ωexp − δest) (1− (1− γ)smax),
i.e., if they do not achieve the expected violation.
15: Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification protocol
PA and obtain the final keys KA and KB of length l.
In Protocol 1, the total number of rounds is not fixed in advance, however for
a number of blocks m large enough the number of rounds will correspond, with high
probability, to the expected value n. This is a technicality introduced in Ref. [1, 39]
in order to obtain better rates in the finite regime. A more detailed explanation can
be found in [39, Appendix B]. Improvements on the second order term of the entropy
accumulation theorem, that do not rely on the introduction of blocks, were recently
obtained in [62]. Following the techniques of [1, 39], we derive Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Key rates for coherent attacks). Either Protocol 1 aborts with probability
higher than 1− (EA + EC), or it generates a (2EC + PA + s)-correct-and-secret key
of length
l ≥ n
s¯
ηopt − n
s¯
h(ωexp − δest)−
√
n
s¯
ν1 − leakEC (7)
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− 3 log
1−
√√√√1− ( s
4(EA + EC)
)2+ 2 log( 1
2PA
)
,
where leakEC is the leakage due to error correction step and the functions s¯, ηopt, ν1 and
ν2 are specified in Table 1.
Theorem 1 sharpens the original analysis [1,39] and has slightly improved key rates
in the finite regime. This results in a reduction of the minimum number of rounds
(signals) required for positive rates by about a factor of two, as illustrated in Figure 1.
A detailed derivation of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix B.3.
Figure 1. Key rate r vs logarithm of the number of rounds n. Comparison of the
improvements in the key rate, for an implementation where the maximally entangled
state is subjected to depolarizing noise and therefore β = 2
√
2(1 − 2Q), for QBER
Q = {0.5%, 2.5%, 5%}. The dashed curves correspond to the key rates derived in the
original analysis [1, 39], the solid lines represent the key rates derived in Theorem 1.
Similarly to [1], we take cDIQKD = 10
−2 and sDIQKD = 10
−5.
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smax =
⌈
1
γ
⌉
s¯ = 1−(1−γ)
d 1γe
γ
ηopt = max 3
4
<
pt(1)
1−(1−γ)smax <
2+
√
2
4
[
Fmin(~p, ~pt)− 1√mν2
]
Fmin(~p, ~pt) =
d
dp(1)
g(~p)
∣∣∣
~pt
· p(1) +
(
g(~pt)− ddp(1)g(~p)
∣∣∣
~pt
· pt(1)
)
g(~p) = s
[
1− h
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
16 p(1)
1−(1−γ)smax
(
p(1)
1−(1−γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
ν2 = 2
(
log (1 + 2 · 2smax3) +
⌈
d
dp(1)
g(~p)|~pt
⌉)√
1− 2 log s
ν1 = 2
(
log 7 +
⌈ |h′(ωexp+δest)|
1−(1−γ)smax
⌉)√
1− 2 log s
Table 1. Explicit form of the terms that appear in Theorem 1. For a detailed
derivation see Appendix B.3.
2.1.2. Key rates for collective attacks For collective attacks, we derive the finite key
rates by employing two techniques: the finite version of the asymptotic equipartition
property and the additivity property of the conditional α-Re´nyi entropies. To deal with
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collective attacks we can use a simplified version of Protocol 1, where the number of
rounds is fixed.
Protocol 2 DIQKD protocol for collective attacks
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: Alice and Bob choose a random bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that P (Ti = 1) = γ.
3: if Ti = 0 then Alice and Bob choose inputs (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2).
4: else they choose Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1} (the observables for the CHSH test).
5: end if
6: Alice and Bob use their devices with the respective inputs and record the outputs,
Ai and Bi respectively.
7: end for
8: Error correction: Alice and Bob apply the error correction protocol EC,
communicating OEC in the process. If EC aborts they abort the protocol, else
they obtain raw keys A˜n1 and B˜
n
1 .
9: Parameter estimation: Using Bn1 and B˜
n
1 , Bob sets for the first test rounds
Ci =
1, if Ai ⊕Bi = Xi · Yi0, if Ai ⊕Bi 6= Xi · Yi (8)
For the remaining rounds he sets Ci = ⊥.
He aborts if∑
j
Cj < γn× (ωexp − δest) ,
i.e., if they do not achieve the expected violation.
10: Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification protocol
PA and obtain the final keys KA and KB of length l.
In the following theorem we state the length of a secure key that can be derived
using the asymptotic equipartition property, which is formally stated in Theorem 7.
Theorem 2. Either Protocol 2 aborts with probability higher than 1 − (con + EC), or
it generates a (2EC + s + PA)-correct-and-secret key of length:
l ≥ n[1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16(ωexp − δest − δcon)((ωexp − δest − δcon)− 1) + 3
)
− (1− γ)h(Q)− γh(ωexp)] (9)
−√n
(
4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)(√
log
2
2s
+
√
log
8
′2EC
))
− log
(
8
′2EC
+
2
2− ′EC
)
− log
(
1
EC
)
− 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
A detailed derivation of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix B.1.
Using a different technique, namely bounding the key rate by the conditional
collision entropy, we derive the following result.
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Theorem 3. Either Protocol 2 aborts with probability higher than 1 − (con + EC), or
it generates a (2EC + PA)-correct-and-secret key of length:
l ≥ n
[
− log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16(ωexp − δest − δcon)(1− (ωexp − δest − δcon))− 2
)
− (1− γ)h(Q)− γh(ωexp)
]
−√n
(
4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
log
8
′2EC
)
(10)
− log
(
8
′2EC
+
2
2− ′EC
)
− log
(
1
EC
)
− 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
−2 log
(
1
con + EC
)
.
An important step in the proof of Theorem 3 is to derive a lower bound on the
collision entropy as a function of the CHSH violation β. A tight lower bound is proved
in Theorem 9. The detailed proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix B.2.
The rates presented in Theorem 2 are asymptotically tight, while Theorem 3
achieves strictly smaller asymptotic rates. However, one can note that in Theorem 3
the term proportional to
√
n has a smaller pre-factor. This can potentially lead to an
advantage for the minimum number of rounds required for security. For Protocol 2, an
advantage can only be observed for very low noise regime, as illustrated in Figure 2.
We remark, however, that for protocols based on other Bell inequalities the techniques
used for deriving Theorem 3 can present significant advantage for the collective attack
analysis. This is further discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Figure 2. Key rates vs logarithm of the number of rounds n for Protocol 2 (collective
attacks). The blue curve represent the key rate using Theorem 2 and the yellow
curve shows the key rate using Theorem 3. It is considered an implementation with
depolarizing noise and QBER Q = 0.01%. The inset graph shows a zoom in the
region of low number of rounds. Similarly to [1], we take cDIQKD = 10
−2 and
sDIQKD = 10
−5.
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The following table lists the parameters of the DIQKD protocols in consideration.
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n expected number of rounds
l final key length
γ fraction of test rounds
Q quantum bit error rate
β CHSH violation
ωexp expected winning probability on the CHSH game in an honest implementation
δest width of the statistical interval for the Bell test
δcon confidence interval for the Bell test in Protocol 2
s smoothing parameter
EC , 
′
EC error probabilities of the error correction protocol
EA error probability of Bell violation estimation in Protocol 1
con error probability of Bell violation estimation in Protocol 2
PA error probability of the privacy amplification protocol
leakEC leakage in the error correction protocol
Table 2. Parameters of the considered DIQKD protocols, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2.
2.2. Comparison of key rates for depolarizing noise model
We now compare the key rates achieved in the finite regime under the assumption of
collective attacks (IID scenario) and against general coherent attacks (fully DI scenario).
As a benchmark, we focus on an honest implementation where the maximally entangled
state is prepared and subjected to depolarizing noise‖:
ρ = (1− ν)
∣∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣∣+ ν I
4
. (11)
In this case, the parameters of interest – the value of the CHSH inequality β and the
QBER Q – relate to the noise parameter ν by
Q =
ν
2
and β = 2
√
2(1− ν) → β = 2
√
2(1− 2Q). (12)
In Figure 3 we compare the key rates achievable under the IID assumption, given
by Theorem 1, and in the fully DI scenario, Theorem 2, for an honest implementation
with depolarizing noise.
‖ This noise model can also be seen as the case where each individual qubit suffers a depolarization
with parameter ν′, where ν = 2ν′ − ν′2.
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Figure 3. Key rates vs logarithm of the number of rounds for collective attacks
(dashed lines) and coherent attacks (solid lines). The different curves represent
different values of QBER Q = (0.5%, 2.5%.5%) considering an implementation where
the maximally entangled state is subjected to depolarizing noise (see relation (12)).
The security parameters are taken as cDIQKD = 10
−2 and sDIQKD = 10
−5.
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Figure 3 shows that the key rates approach the same asymptotic values, however
the minimum number of rounds required to guarantee security is significantly higher
for general coherent attacks. Indeed, by adding the assumption that the eavesdropper
is restricted to collective attacks, the minimum number of signals required to have a
positive key rate drops by about two orders of magnitude. However, even for collective
attacks, this minimum number of required rounds is considerably large given the current
entanglement generation rates. This is one of the big challenges to be overcome for a
DIQKD implementation. In the next Section we are going to discuss the state of the art
of experiments, and situate the current achievable parameters (Bell violation, QBER
and entanglement generation rate) in the security proofs.
2.3. The state-of-the-art experimental DIQKD
In the following, we discuss experimental platforms in which DIQKD may be
implemented. We analyse Bell violations and expected QBER achieved in previous
Bell tests with distant setups and situate these parameters in the context of the key
rates derived in Theorems 1 and 2. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 4
and Figures 5 and 6.
In experimental setups, distant entanglement is typically generated using photons
to establish the connection. We distinguish two approaches based on the role of the
photonic qubits: (i) All-photonic schemes: Approaches in which the entangled state is
encoded in the photonic state directly. In this case, measurements of the photonic states
on two remote setups enable to infer their entanglement. (ii) Heralded schemes: In this
case, the entangled state is typically created in a long-lived system and the photons are
used as a means of establishing the entanglement between two distant systems.
In this section we provide a discussion of the parameters in each of these schemes
and the related challenges towards an implementation of DIQKD. We provide a more
detailed discussion of one of the systems, namely nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centres in
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diamonds, and describe improvements in experimental parameters that can lead to a
DIQKD implementation in the near future.
2.3.1. DIQKD with all-photonic entanglement. Since in all-photonic schemes the
entangled state is directly encoded on the photonic state, photon losses limit the
entangled state detection efficiency. Closing the detection loophole in a Bell test
thus requires very efficient entangled-photon sources and photon detectors. Recent
technological advances enabled all-photonic Bell tests that close the detection-loophole
[57,58], later combined with spacelike separation in loophole-free Bell tests [54,55].
In photonic systems the detection efficiency also impacts the entangled state fidelity.
We thus may expect that Bell violations are low in photonic systems. To avoid having
to deal with undetected events, photonic Bell tests typically employ the CH-Eberhard
inequality [63, 64]. The CHSH and CH-Eberhard inequalities are equivalent¶, such
that we can estimate the CHSH violation achieved in photonic experiments. Table 4
presents the corresponding value for the CHSH inequality achieved in the experiments
of Refs. [54,55,57,58]. One can note that the violations achieved are indeed low, ranging
from 2.00004 to 2.02. Combined with a finite QBER (> 2%), this poses a significant
challenge for the implementation of a DIQKD protocol in photonic systems.
However, if these systems would enter the regime of positive key rates, the
entanglement generation rate can be very high (∼ 105 Hz), such that they could easily
reach the asymptotic key rate values.
In order to overcome photon losses, several proposals for implementing heralding
schemes in all-photonic systems were presented. In this case, the entangled state is
created between photons and, also, this entanglement is heralded by the interference of
other photons. In particular, in Ref. [65] the authors propose a scheme based on a qubit
amplifier that combines single photon sources and linear optics. This proposal was
further explored in Ref. [66]. Schemes based on entanglement swapping by quantum
relay were also considered [67–69]. Ref. [67] makes a comparison of the performance
of the two types of schemes. Analyses in Refs. [65, 67–69] make assumptions on the
possible attacks performed by the eavesdropper. New protocols based on single photon
sources were recently proposed in Ref. [70]. The proposed schemes uses a combination
of spontaneous parametric down conversion sources and single-photon sources in order
to achieve a setup where a heralding process could overcome transmission photon losses.
The security analysis presented in Ref. [70] does not restrict the eavesdropper attacks.
These setups are a promising proposal to bring the parameters of all-photonic systems to
the region of positive asymptotic key rates (see Figure 5 and 6). However single-photon
sources still lack the required performance for an implementation of these schemes.
2.3.2. DIQKD with heralded entanglement. Due to the nature of heralded entangling
schemes, photon losses do not influence the entangled state detection efficiency or
¶ One can see that by replacing non-detected events by the deterministic classical strategy “output 1”
in a test of the CHSH inequality.
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fidelity. Heralded schemes have been used to entangle distant atomic ensembles [71,72],
trapped ions [73], atoms [74], NV centres [75], quantum dots [76], and mechanical
oscillators [77]. So far, entangled state fidelities sufficiently high to violate Bell’s
inequalities have only been reached with trapped ions [59, 60], atoms [56, 74], and with
NV centres [53, 78]. The Bell violations observed in Refs. [53, 56, 59, 60, 78] are in the
range β = 2.22 to β = 2.41, with a lower bound on the QBER, estimated from detection
efficiencies alone, around 0.04 (see Table 4 for a full overview). Apart from the results
reported in [60], these parameters are not in the region of positive key rate (see Figures
5 and 6). However, all of them are in the proximity of this region, such that setup
improvements may enable to reach it.
The challenge for these implementations is however their low entangling rate,
induced by photon losses. Current rates range from (minutes)−1 [56, 59, 60, 74] to
(hours)−1 [53, 78]. A significant speed-up in the entanglement generation rate is thus
needed in order to achieve the minimum number of rounds required for DIQKD. Higher
entangling rates in heralded schemes were recently achieved with trapped ions [79] and
NV centres [80, 81], although with lower state fidelities, and no Bell violations are
reported. Even though in Ref. [81] the state fidelity is just high enough to be able
to violate Bell inequalities, the expected Bell violation would be low. Enhancement in
entangling rates, e.g. with optical cavities to improve light-matter coupling efficiency
[82] is therefore crucial to achieving an implementation of DIQKD with heralded
schemes.
2.3.3. Nitrogen-vacancy centre-based networks. In this section, we focus on heralded
entanglement generation between nitrogen-vacancy centres in diamond for DIQKD.
Nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centres are defect centres in the diamond lattice. They contain
an electronic spin with good coherence properties and spin-selective optical transitions
that can be used for intialization, readout and entanglement generation [75, 83]. Next
to the electronic spin, nearby weakly coupled nuclear spins can serve as long-lived
memories [84,85]. These properties make the NV centre a promising quantum network
node.
Entanglement between distant NV centres can be generated using an heralded
scheme. Typically, local entanglement is first generated between the NV electronic
spin and a photon mode. And subsequently, entanglement between distant NV centres
is achieved through entanglement swapping by interfering the two photon modes from
distant setups [86]. As discussed above for heralded protocols, photon attenuation does
not influence the fidelity of the generated entangled state or the detection efficiency.
The detection of the spin states has near-unit efficiency [87].
DIQKD parameters. In a loophole-free Bell test with NV centres [53, 78], a CHSH
violation β = 2.38 ± 0.14 was observed between systems separated by 1.3 kilometers.
Taking into account the entangled state fidelity and detection efficiency, we estimate
that the corresponding QBER would be Q = 0.06±0.03. The Bell violation achieved in
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[53,78] is considerably high, especially if compared to loophole-free Bell test experiments
in photonic systems [54,55]. However, these parameters are not good enough to generate
a secure key. Indeed, using Theorems 1 and 2, one concludes that it is not possible to
achieve positive key rate with these parameters (see Figures 5 and 6).
In the following, we suggest two near-term experimental improvements to enhance
these parameters.
Firstly, the frequency stability of the laser used to excite NV centres during the
entanglement protocols can be increased using an external cavity. The instability of the
laser can influence the indistinguishability of photons emitted by the distant NV centres.
The indistinguishability is crucial for photon interference, which can be quantified by
the visibility of the two-photon quantum interference (TPQI). We expect that compared
to previous implementation [53], the improved laser frequency stability can lead to an
improvement in TPQI visibility from 0.88 to 0.90.
Secondly, both the CHSH violation β and the QBER Q are impacted by the NV
electronic spin state readout. The readout can be performed using resonant excitation
of a spin-selective optical transition [87]. Improvements to the detection efficiency can
be obtained by storing the spin state in the nearby nitrogen spin state, and performing
repeated readout [88]. We estimate that the repeated readout can lead to an average
readout fidelity of ≈ 0.985, compared to an initial 0.97 [89] +.
Other improvements can be envisioned, such as enhancement of the detection
efficiency by improving the photon collection efficiency through the use of parabolic
reflectors [90] or optical cavities [91]. In the following discussion we limit ourselves to
the two advances listed above and summarized in Table 3.
DIQKD parameters Ref. [53, 78] Expected
setup A B A B
average readout fidelity 0.974 0.969 0.985 0.985
TPQI visibility 0.88 0.90
β 2.38 ± 0.14 2.47
Q 0.06 ± 0.03 0.051
Table 3. The CHSH violation β and QBER Q in NV centre-based implementations
are strongly dependent on the TPQI visibility and the readout fidelity. The resulting
values are shown for parameters achieved in a loophole-free Bell test, and for expected
values from several readily-implementable improvements.
Taking into account these improvements, the expected DIQKD parameters are β ≈
2.47 and Q ≈ 0.051. In Figure 4 we illustrate the rates achievable for these parameters
against general coherent attacks and under the assumption that the eavesdropper is
+ We note that this readout method increases the readout duration, which compromises spacelike
setup-separation. However, security in a DIQKD implementation does not require spacelike separation
since it is superfluous with the assumption of isolated labs in place (see Assumptions 1). Therefore, an
increased readout time does not present a problem for security.
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restricted to collective attacks. We see that the required minimum number of rounds is
of order 108 for general attacks, and about 5× 106 for collective attacks.
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Figure 4. Key rates vs logarithm of the number of rounds n for parameters that
are readily-implementable in NV centres setups (CHSH violation β = 2.47 and QBER
Q = 0.051). The red line shows the key rates obtained against general coherent attacks,
and the blue dashed line shows the key rates under the assumption of collective attacks.
The security parameters are chosen to be cDIQKD = 10
−2 and sDIQKD = 10
−5.
Entangling rate. Although the improved parameters lead to a positive key rate, this
does not mean that DIQKD with NV centres is readily achievable. The system faces
another challenge: the probabilistic nature of the heralded entanglement scheme limits
the entanglement generation rate.
In the heralded entanglement generation protocol used in [53,75] the photonic qubit
is time-bin encoded and entanglement is heralded with the detection of a photon in each
of two time-bins [86]. Since two photons have to be detected, the rate of the protocol
is proportional to the square of the photon losses. For the spacelike separated setups
in [53] the total emission and detection efficiency per photon is ≈ 10−4, leading to a
total success probability of ≈ 10−8. Since the repetition rate, limited by the spin-state
reset time, is of the order of ≈ µs, generating a raw key of length 106 bits would take
≈ 103 days. It is clear that a speed-up of entanglement generation rate is required to
use NV centres in a DIQKD protocol. We describe two approaches toward this.
Firstly, this could be achieved by adapting the entanglement generation protocol. A
linear dependency of the rate on photon losses can be achieved by employing an extreme-
photon-loss (EPL) protocol [92] or single-photon (SP) protocol [93]. Demonstrated
implementations of these protocols with NV centres indeed provide a speed-up in
entanglement rate of three orders of magnitude [80,81]. However, these implementations
do not yet provide the entangled state fidelities leading to Bell violations that allow for
DIQKD (the entangled state fidelities are FEPL = 0.65 ± 0.03 and FSP = 0.81 ± 0.02,
leading to no Bell violation for the EPL protocol and a small violation βSP = 2.1 for the
single photon protocol). Better parameters may be achieved with improvements of the
robustness of the nuclear-spin memories [85] and with an improved photon detection
versus dark-count rate [93].
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Secondly, an increase in the entanglement rate can be achieved by a reduction of
the photon losses per round. These losses consist of three parts: a low coherent-photon
emission probability, a non-unit collection efficiency and fiber attenuation. The photon
attenuation during transmission over fibers is ≈ 8 dB for the NV emission wavelength
(637 nm). To maintain high entangling rates for distant setups, this should be reduced.
This can be achieved by frequency downconversion of the photons at a wavelength of 637
nm emitted by the NV centres to telecom frequencies [94,95]. The emission probability
of coherent photons, ≈ 3%, and subsequent collection efficiency (≈ 10%, [75]) together
limit the best achievable entangling rates. They can be addressed simultaneously by
embedding the NV centre in an optical cavity to enhance coherent-photon emission and
the collection efficiency [91]. A promising approach employs NV centres in diamond
membranes in Fabry-Perot microcavities [96–98]. In such a design NV centres remain far
away from the optical interface, retaining bulk-like optical coherence properties. These
cavities are expected to provide three orders of magnitude enhancement in entangling
rate for a two-click protocol [97]. Together with the improved DIQKD parameters
described above, this makes a demonstration of DIQKD with NV centres experimentally
feasible.
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β Q
(1) Matsukevich et al., PRL 100, 150404 (2008) [59] 2.22± 0.07 0.041± 0.003
(2) Pironio et al., Nature 464, 1021-1024 (2010) [60] 2.414± 0.058 0.041± 0.003
(3) Giustina et al., Nature 497, 227-230 (2013) [57] 2.02096± 0.00032 0.0297± 0.0003
(4) Christensen et al., PRL 111, 130406 (2013) [58] 2.00022± 0.00003 0.0244± 0.0009
(5) Giustina et al., PRL 115, 250401 (2015) [54] 2.000030± 0.000002 0.0379± 0.0002
(6) Shalm et al., PRL 115, 250402 (2015) [55] 2.00004± 0.00001 0.0292± 0.0002
(7) Hensen et al., Nature 526 682-686 (2015) [53] 2.38± 0.14 0.06± 0.03
(8) Rosenfeld et al., PRL 119, 010402 (2017) [56] 2.221± 0.033 0.035± 0.003
(9) Expected improvements in NV systems 2.47 0.051
Table 4. Summary of the estimated parameters of interest for DIQKD. (1,2) are
Bell tests with trapped ions, (3-5) are all-photonic experiments, (7) uses NV centres
and (8) trapped atoms. (9) reports on near-term achievable parameters with NV
centers as described in Section 2.3.3. In all experiments the detection loophole is
closed; (5-8) additionally close the locality loophole. The CHSH violations for neutral
atoms (8), trapped ions (1,2) and NV centres (7) are as reported in the corresponding
experiments. For (3), (4) and (5), in which the value of the CH-Eberhard inequality J
is reported, we make use of the relation β = 4J + 2 between the CHSH value and the
CH-Eberhard value. This relation is found if one attributes “output 1” to undetected
events in a CHSH inequality test. For (6) the CHSH violation was estimated directly
from the reported data. For the estimation of the QBER (Q), in (1),(2) and (8) we
assume perfect classical correlation in the generated state and find a lower bound
for the QBER from reported detection efficiencies (0.979 ± 0.002 [99] for (1) and (2),
and 0.982 ± 0.002 [100] for (8)). For NV centres (7), we additionally account for
imperfections in the entangled state based on the reported density matrix. For all-
photonic systems (3-6), the QBER is estimated by taking into account the detection
efficiency and using the reported estimated state and the measurements performed by
Alice, optimizing over measurements for Bob.
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Figure 5. Region of positive key rates for coherent attacks: The red area is the region
of values of QBER (Q) and CHSH violation (β) for which a positive key rate cannot be
reached with any number of rounds. In the green area, the dashed curves represents
the minimum number of rounds required to get positive key rate. For parameters
above each curve, a key rate can be extracted if the number of rounds is higher
than specified in the curve. The points show the Bell violation and estimated QBER
achieved by previous experiments (see Table 4). They, however, do not reflect the
corresponding entanglement generation rates. Similarly to [1], we take cDIQKD = 10
−2
and sDIQKD = 10
−5.
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Figure 6. Region of positive key rates for collective attacks: The red area is the region
of values of QBER (Q) and CHSH violation (β) for which a positive key rate cannot be
reached with any number of rounds. In the green area, the dashed curves represents
the minimum number of rounds required to get positive key rate. For parameters
above each curve, a key rate can be extracted if the number of rounds is higher
than specified in the curve. The points show the Bell violation and estimated QBER
achieved by previous experiments (see Table 4). They, however, do not reflect the
corresponding entanglement generation rates. Similarly to [1], we take cDIQKD = 10
−2
and sDIQKD = 10
−5.
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3. Discussion
Detection-loophole-free Bell tests between separated setups mark an important step
towards the implementation of DIQKD. Progress towards extending Bell experiments
to larger distances were also achieved, in particular by the Bell tests additionally closing
the locality loophole. However a DIQKD protocol has not yet been implemented.
In order to shed light on the experimental performance needed for DIQKD, we
have derived the key rates in the finite size regime as a function of the experimental
parameters: CHSH violation β and QBER Q. For comparison of the key rates obtained
in the finite regime for coherent and collective attacks, we have used as a benchmark
an implementation where the maximally entangled state is subjected to depolarizing
noise. Although the asymptotic key rates against collective attacks and general coherent
attacks coincide, it is known that this is not the case in the finite regime. We find that,
with the currently available tools, security against coherent attacks requires a minimum
number of rounds about two orders of magnitude higher than what is necessary for
security against collective attacks for realistic near-term parameters.
Here, we have focused on DIQKD protocols that use the CHSH inequality. So
Towards a realization of device-independent quantum key distribution 23
far the CHSH inequality is the one which leads to the best performance for a DIQKD
protocol. The challenge in using other Bell inequalities is that, up to date, only non-
tight lower bounds on the secure key rates can be derived. Therefore, it is still an open
question whether any other Bell inequality can outperform the CHSH, either in terms of
maximum tolerable QBER, higher rates or lower minimum number of rounds required.
Towards exploring the potential of different experimental platforms to implement
DIQKD, we have analyzed the Bell violation and expected QBER of previously
performed Bell tests and situated these parameters in the context of the derived key
rates. Figures 5 and 6 summarize this analysis.
For photonic systems, a DIQKD implementation is currently barred by the very
low CHSH violation. To overcome this, a strong reduction of photon losses is required.
Detection-loophole free Bell tests based on heralded entanglement schemes
approach the allowed region, with the Bell test of Ref. [60], performed with trapped
ions separated by 1 meter, even exhibiting parameters in the allowed region. These
heralded schemes however suffer from low entangling rates resulting from photon
losses. An increase in the entangling rates is expected to be achieved by improving
collection efficiencies, e.g. by employing optical cavities. Moreover, with frequency
downconversion these results can be extended to long ( 1 km) distances. We illustrate
that with near-term experimental improvements for NV centres, in combination with
optical cavities for enhancing entangling rate, described in Section 2.3.3, a demonstration
of DIQKD is achievable.
4. Methods
We now present the theoretical tools that allows us to derive the key rates for the device-
independent quantum key distribution protocols, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2. We start
by defining some quantities that are going to play an important role in the security
proof and state in more details the security definition for device-independent quantum
key distribution.
4.1. Notation and definitions
In cryptographic tasks, we are often interested in estimating what is the maximum
probability with which an adversary can guess the value of a classical variable A∗. This
is defined as the guessing probability pguess. In the general case where the adversary
might have access to a quantum side information E, and therefore the state of interest
is a cq-state (classical-quantum state) ρAE, the guessing probability is defined as:
pguess(A|E)ρ = sup
{MaE}
∑
a
p(A = a)ρTr
(
MaEρE|A=a
)
, (13)
∗ In QKD, for example, the classical variable is the string of bits that Alice holds after measuring her
quantum systems.
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where the supremum is taken over all POVMs {MaE} that can be performed on the
system E. The min-entropy of the classical variable A conditioned on the quantum side
information E is then given by [101]
Hmin(A|E)ρ = − log pguess(A|E)ρ. (14)
A smoothed version of the min-entropy can also be defined.
Definition 3 (Smooth min-entropy). For a quantum state ρAE and  ∈ [0, 1)
Hmin(A|E)ρ = sup
ρ˜AE∈B(ρAB)
Hmin(A|E)ρ˜, (15)
where the supremum is taken over positive sub-normalized operators that are -close to
ρAB in the purifying distance [102].
The smoothing parameter  allows us to restrict attention to typical events (the ones
that occur with probability higher than 1−δ(), where δ() is a function of the smoothing
parameter). As a consequence, the smoothed min- and max-entropies (see Appendix A
for definition) have many nice properties and find an operational interpretation in many
applications [102,103].
Other quantities of interest that will appear along the text are the conditional von-
Neumann entropy, H(A|E)ρ, and the conditional collision entropy H2(A|E)ρ. They are
particular cases of the one-parameter family of entropies called sandwiched conditional
Re´yni entropies, first defined in Ref. [104].
Definition 4. For any density operator ρAE and for α ∈ [12 , 1)∪ (1,∞) the sandwiched
α-Re´yni entropy of A conditioned on E is defined as
Hα(A|E)ρ := 1
1− α log
(
Tr
[(
ρ
1−α
2α
E ρAEρ
1−α
2α
E
)α])
, (16)
where ρ
1−α
2α
E is a short notation for IA ⊗ ρ
1−α
2α
E .
A variant can also be defined as
H↑α(A|E)ρ := sup
σE∈S
1
1− α log
(
Tr
[(
σ
1−α
2α
E ρAEσ
1−α
2α
E
)α])
, (17)
where S denotes the set of quantum states and the supremum is taken over density
operators σE.
The min- and max- entropy correspond to the extremal cases of definition (17) for
α = ∞ and α = 1
2
respectively. For α → 1, definition (16) and (17) coincide and one
recover the standard conditional von-Neumann entropy. Properties of the conditional
α-Re´yni entropies are presented in Appendix A.
4.2. Security of DIQKD
In order to determine what it means for a DIQKD protocol to be secure, we adopt
the security definition used in [39]. This security definition follows the universally
composable security definition for standard QKD protocols [40]. However it is important
to note that for the device-independent case composability was never proved and attacks
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proposed in Ref. [41] show that composability is not achieved if the same devices are
re-used for generation of a subsequent key.
In the composably secure paradigm, the security of a protocol is defined in terms
of its distance to an ideal protocol [40, 105]. Following this definition, given a protocol
described by the completely positive and trace preserving (CPTP) map diqkdreal, we
say that the protocol is sDIQKD-secure for any 
s
DIQKD ≥  if:
 :=
1
2
‖diqkdreal − diqkdideal‖ (18)
= sup
ρABE
1
2
‖diqkdreal(ρABE)− diqkdideal(ρABE)‖1. (19)
Expression (19) can be split into two terms that reflect independently the
correctness and the secrecy of the protocol (see [40]), given by Definitions 1 and 2.
Correctness is the statement that Alice and Bob share equal strings of bits at the end
of the protocol. And secrecy states how much information the eavesdropper can have
about their shared key.
Another requirement for a good DIQKD protocol is that there exist a realistic
implementation that do not lead the protocol to abort almost all the time, i.e., the
protocol should have some robustness. This is captured by the concept of completeness.
Definition 5 (Security). A DIQKD protocol is (sDIQKD, 
c
DIQKD, l)-secure if
(i) (Soundness) For any implementation of the protocol, either it aborts with probability
greater than 1−sDIQKD or an sDIQKD-correct-and-secret key of length l is obtained.
(ii) (Completeness) There exists an honest implementation of the protocol such that the
probability of not aborting, p(Ω), is greater than 1− cDIQKD.
The correctness of the final key is ensured by the error correction step. During
error correction, Alice sends to Bob a sufficient amount of information so that he can
correct his raw key. If Alice and Bob do not abort in this step, then the probability
that they end up with different raw keys is guaranteed to be very small. For the
secrecy of the protocol, according to Definition 2, one needs to estimate how far the
final state describing Alice’s key and the eavesdropper system is from a state where
the eavesdropper is totally ignorant about Alice’s key, see Eq. (4). The formal security
proof of quantum key distribution became possible due to the quantum Leftover Hashing
Lemma [49, 106] that quantifies the secrecy of a protocol as a function of a conditional
entropy of the state before privacy amplification and the length of the final key.
Theorem 4 (Leftover Hashing Lemma ( [49], Theorem 5.5.1)). Let ρAn1E be a classical-
quantum state and let H be a 2-universal family of hash functions, from {0, 1}n to
{0, 1}l, that maps the classical n-bit string An1 into KA. Then
‖ρKAHE − τKA ⊗ ρHE‖1 ≤ 2−
1
2(H
↑
2 (A
n
1 |E)ρ−l). (20)
For the proof of the Leftover Hashing Lemma we refer to Ref. [49]. In Ref. [49],
it was shown that the Leftover Hashing lemma can also be formulated in terms of the
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smooth min-entropy, and the price to pay is only a linear term in the security parameter].
Theorem 5 (Leftover Hashing Lemma with smooth min-entropy [11, 49]). Let ρAn1E
be a classical-quantum state and let H be a 2-universal family of hash functions, from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}l, that maps the classical n-bit string An1 into KA. Then
‖ρKAHE − τKA ⊗ ρHE‖1 ≤ 2−
1
2(Hmin(An1 |E)ρ−l) + 2. (21)
Given the Leftover Hash Lemma, stated in Theorems 4 and 5, and the definition of
secrecy, Definition 2, we can now express the length of a secure key as a function of the
entropy of Alice’s raw key conditioned on Eve’s information before privacy amplification.
Theorem 6 (Key length). Let p(Ω) be the probability that the DIQKD protocol does not
abort for a particular implementation. If the length of the key generated after privacy
amplification is given by
l = H↑2 (A
n
1 |E)ρ|Ω − 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
. (22)
then the DIQKD protocol is PA-secret.
We can also express the key length in terms of the smooth min-entropy, where if l
satisfies
l = H
s/p(Ω)
min (A
n
1 |E)ρ|Ω − 2 log
(
p(Ω)
2PA
)
(23)
≥ Hs/p(Ω)min (An1 |E)ρ|Ω − 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
, (24)
then the DIQKD protocol is (PA + s)-secret.
We see that the leftover hashing lemma expressed in terms of smooth min-entropy
only leads to an extra s term in the security parameter. However, the smooth
min-entropy can be much larger than the 2-Re´nyi entropy H↑2 and, therefore, it is
advantageous to lower bound the key by the smooth min-entropy.
4.3. Security analysis
In the previous section we have seen that in order to determine the length of a secret
key generated by a particular protocol one needs to estimate the (smooth-min or 2-
Re´nyi) entropy of Alice’s string conditioned on all the information available to the
eavesdropper before privacy amplification. Now, in order to estimate this quantity for
a DIQKD protocol one faces two main challenges:
• How to evaluate the entropy of a very long string of bits?
• How to evaluate the one-round entropy in the device-independent scenario?
] In Ref. [49], the leftover hash lemma was formulated with the smooth min-entropy defined as a
supremum over states that are -close to ρ in the trace norm. The proof of Theorem 5, with the smooth
min-entropy defined according to Definition 4, can be found in Ref. [11].
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In Section 4.3.1 we present the theoretical tools that allow to reduce the problem of
evaluating the entropy of a string of bits to the evaluation of a single round. Moreover, in
the DI scenario we do not want to make any assumptions over the underlying quantum
state and measurement devices. In Section 4.3.2 we present a tight bound derived
in [16,27] for the one round conditional von Neumann entropy of protocols where Alice
and Bob test the CHSH inequality. Moreover we explore further this bound to prove a
tight bound on the single round conditional collision entropy as a function of the CHSH
violation.
4.3.1. Reducing the problem to the estimation of one round. We now present the
techniques that allow to reduce the evaluation of the entropy H
s/p(Ω)
min (A
n
1 |E)ρ|Ω to
the estimation of the conditional von Neumann entropy of a single round for the
two adversarial scenarios under consideration, collective attacks and coherent attacks.
Moreover, for the IID scenario, i.e. when the eavesdropper is assumed to be restricted
to collective attacks, we show how to break the analysis of the entropy H↑2 (A
n
1 |E)ρ|Ω into
single rounds evaluation.
The IID scenario (collective attacks). When we restrict the eavesdropper to collective
attacks, we are assuming that, even though she can perform an arbitrary operation in
her quantum side information, the state distributed by the source and the behavior of
Alice’s and Bob’s devices are the same in every round of the protocol. This implies
that after n rounds, the state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve is ρAn1Bn1E = ρ
⊗n
ABE. In this
case, the quantum asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [61] allows to break the
conditional smooth min-entropy of state ρ⊗nAE into n times the conditional von Neumann
entropy of the state ρAE.
Theorem 7 (Asymptotic equipartition property [61]). Let ρ = ρ⊗nAE be an i.i.d. state.
Then for n ≥ 8
5
log 2
2
Hmin(A
n
1 |En1 )ρ⊗nAE ≥ nH(A|E)ρAE −
√
n δ(, η) (25)
and similarly
Hmax(A
n
1 |En1 )ρ⊗nAE ≤ nH(A|E)ρAE +
√
n δ(, η) (26)
where δ(, η) = 4 log η
√
log 2
2
and η =
√
2−Hmin(A|E)ρAE +
√
2Hmax(A|E)ρAE + 1.
The quantum AEP is a generalization to quantum systems of the classical statement
that, in the limit of many repetitions of a random experiment, the output sequence is
one from the typical set. Therefore, under the assumption of collective attacks, the
quantum AEP reduces the problem of estimating the key rate of a string of n bits to
the problem of bounding the one-round conditional von Neumann entropy. We remark
that the AEP implies an additional term, proportional to
√
n, which is significant for
the finite regime analyses.
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In Section 4.2, we have seen that the left-over hashing lemma can also be stated
in the terms of the 2-Re´yni conditional entropy H↑2 (A|E)ρ. A useful property of the
conditional H↑α entropies is additivity [102] (see Appendix A Property 1(ii)), which
implies the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let ρ = ρ⊗nAE be an i.i.d. state. Then
H↑2 (A
n
1 |En1 )ρ⊗nAE = nH
↑
2 (A|E)ρAE ≥ nH2(A|E)ρAE , (27)
where H2(A|E)ρAE is denoted collision entropy.
Validity of Lemma 1 can be seen from the following: equality in (27) follows from
the additivity property of H↑α entropies, Property 1(ii) in Appendix A, and the inequality
follows from the definition of α-Re´nyi entropies, Definition 4.
Therefore, for collective attacks one can break the analysis into the evaluation of
a single-round entropy by using both, the formulation of the left-over hashing lemma
in terms of the smooth-min entropy, Theorem 5, and in terms of the 2-Re´nyi entropy,
Theorem 4. The possible advantage of using Lemma 1 over the AEP, Theorem 7, is that
no extra overhead term O(√n) is gained due to the additive property of the 2-Re´yni
conditional entropy H↑2 (A|E)ρ. However, in general the von Neumann entropy can be
much larger than the collision entropy, and this trade-off has to be taken into account.
We remark that, for protocols based on other Bell inequalities, the techniques used for
deriving Theorem 3 can be advantageous for collective attack analysis. This is due to
the fact that for other Bell inequalities there is no known technique to directly bound
the conditional von-neumann entropy and a good bound on the min-entropy can be
found using semidefinite-programming techniques (see Section 4.3.2).
The fully DI scenario (coherent attacks). In the fully device-independent scenario the
eavesdropper can perform a general coherent attack, and the state shared by the parties
may not be of the form ρ⊗nABE. Therefore, the tools presented in the previous section are
not applicable in this scenario. In standard QKD, de Finetti techniques [48,49,51] allow
one to extend the proofs against collective attacks to coherent attacks for protocols
that present some symmetry. The price to pay is an overhead term O(√n) whose
pre-factor depends on the dimension of the underlying system. However, in the device-
independent scenario, we do not want to make assumptions on the dimension of the
underlying system. Moreover, symmetry of the protocol is not guaranteed, as we do
not know the behaviour of the measurement devices. Therefore, de Finetti techniques
cannot be used to straightforwardly extend the security proofs against collective attacks
to coherent attacks in the device-independent scenario.
Recently, this problem was overcome by the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT)
[1,52]. In this section, we state the entropy accumulation theorem, which allows to break
the entropy H
s/p(Ω)
min (A
n
1 |E)ρ|Ω into the entropy of single rounds and therefore extends
proofs against collective attacks to coherent attacks.
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An important ingredient in the formulation of the EAT is the concept of
min-/max-tradeoff function of a channel.
Definition 6. Let Ni be a CPTP map that maps Ri−1 to AˆiBˆiCiRi, where Aˆi, Bˆi and Ci
are classical registers and the value of Ci can be inferred from Aˆi and Bˆi. Let ~q denote a
probability distribution on the possible values the random variable Ci can assume. The
min- and max-tradeoff functions for the channel Ni are defined as:
fmin(~q) ≤ inf
σ∈Σi(~q)
H(Aˆi|BˆiR)σ, (28)
fmax(~q) ≥ sup
σ∈Σi(~q)
H(Aˆi|BˆiR)σ, (29)
where
Σi(~q) =
{
σCiAˆiBˆiRiR = (Ni ⊗ IR)(ωRi−1R)|σCi = ~q
}
, (30)
and the infimum and supremum are set to +∞,−∞, respectively, if the set Σi(~q) is
empty.
Definition 6 states that the min-(max-)tradeoff function is a lower (upper) bound
on the conditional von Neumann entropy H(Aˆi|BˆiR)σ of a final state σCiAˆiBˆiRiR, for
all states that result from the action of the channel Ni on an arbitrary initial state
and exhibit a particular distribution ~q over the classical variable Ci, where R is a
side information. In particular, for a DIQKD protocol, where we are testing the
CHSH inequality, the variable Aˆi can be the outputs of Alice and Bob in round i,
Aˆ = {Ai, Bi}. The variable Bˆi can be the inputs of Alice and Bob together with the
variable that determines whether the round is a test round or a key generation round,
Bˆi = {Xi, Yi, Ti}. And R can represent any quantum side information E that the
eavesdropper holds. We will then be interested in defining a variable Ci that assumes
value 1 if the condition of the CHSH game is satisfied (i.e. if the outputs of Alice and
Bob satisfy Ai +Bi = Xi · Yi), 0 if it is not satisfied and we attribute the value ⊥ if the
inequality was not tested in that round (i.e. if Ti = 0, the key generations rounds). Now
the distributions ~q = (q(0), q(1), q(⊥)) of interest are the ones that achieve a winning
probability ω for the CHSH game, i.e. q(1)
1−q(⊥) = ω. The EAT channel Ni represents
local maps that, according to the value of Ti, generate the variables Xi, Yi randomly
and independently, and then generate the outcomes Ai and Bi. Finally, the set of states
Σi(~q) of interest are all the states resulting from the action of this channel in an arbitrary
state and exhibiting a violation β = 8ω−4 for the CHSH inequality. For a more detailed
description of the EAT channel associated to Protocol 1, we refer the reader to [1, 39].
We now state the entropy accumulation theorem.
Theorem 8 (The entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [52]). For an event Ω that
happens with probability p(Ω), and for t such that fmin(freq(c
n
1 )) ≥ t ∀ cn1 ∈ Ω, it holds
that
Hmin(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω > nt− ν
√
n (31)
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and similarly, for t′ such that fmax(freq(cn1 )) ≤ t′ ∀ cn1 ∈ Ω,
Hmax(A
n
1 |Bn1E)ρ|Ω < nt′ + ν
√
n (32)
with
ν = 2 (log (1 + 2dA) + d‖∇f‖∞e)
√
1− 2 log (s · p(Ω)) (33)
for f equals to fmin and fmax respectively .
Analogous to the AEP, the entropy accumulation theorem allows us to break the
entropy of the string of bits into the entropy of a single round. Note, however, that this
single-round entropy does not refer to the real entropy of each round of the protocol, but
is evaluated over the hypothetical states that would achieve the observed violation. It
is important to remark that a crucial assumption in the EAT [1,52] is that some of the
variables of interested satisfy what is called the Markov condition. This is the case for
QKD protocols performed sequentially. For definition and discussion of the implications
of the Markov condition, see [52].
4.3.2. Estimating the one-round entropy. Now that we have reduced the evaluation
of the secret key length to the estimation of the conditional von Neumann entropy of
a single round, we are ready to face the next challenge: How to estimate the single
round entropy without any assumptions on the quantum states and behavior of the
measurement devices.
The CHSH scenario: The CHSH scenario [37], where Alice and Bob each perform
one among two possible binary measurements, is significantly simpler than other Bell
scenarios. Due to the fact that the CHSH inequality has only two binary inputs per
party, a strong result [107, 108] states that the description of any realization of a
CHSH experiment can be decomposed into subspaces of dimension two, where projective
measurements are performed in each subspace. This allows one to restrict the analysis
to qubits, which significantly simplifies the problem. Exploring these nice properties,
a tight bound on the von Neumann entropy of Alice’s outcome conditioned on Eve’s
information, as a function of the CHSH violation, was derived in [16,27].
Lemma 2. Given that Alice and Bob share a state ρAB that achieves a violation β for
the CHSH inequality, it holds that
H(A|E)ρ ≥ 1− h
1
2
+
1
2
√√√√(β
2
)2
− 1
 . (34)
In Section 4.3.1 we have seen that for collective attacks the key rate can also be
estimated by the single round collision entropy. And due to the additivity property of
H↑2 , no overhead
√
n term is present. Therefore, this analysis can potentially lead to
an advantage with respect to the minimum number of rounds required for positive key
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rate. The conditional collision entropy satisfies the following relation [102, Corollary
5.3]
H2(A|E)ρ ≥ Hmin(A|E)ρ. (35)
And a lower bound for the conditional min-entropy as a function of the Bell violation
was derived in [109]:
Hmin(A|E)ρ ≥ − log
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− β
2
4
 . (36)
Therefore expression (36) can be used to bound the conditional collision entropy as
a function of the violation β. We now prove that this bound is actually tight.
Theorem 9. There exist a state ρ∗AB and measurements for Alice and Bob such that,
ρ∗AB achieves violation β and the collision entropy of Alice’s output A conditioned on
Eve’s quantum information E is
H2(A|E)ρ∗ = − log
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− β
2
4
 . (37)
The proof of Theorem 9 is presented in Appendix C. Theorem 9 together with
relations (35) and (36) imply a tight lower bound for the conditional collision entropy
as a function of the CHSH violation β. In Figure 4.3.2 we plot H(A|E) and H2(A|E) as
a function of the violation β. One can see that the points of maximum and minimum
entropy (corresponding to maximal violation β = 2
√
2 and no violation, respectively)
coincide, but for intermediate values of β the conditional collision entropy is smaller
than the conditional von Neumann entropy.
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Figure 7. Graph illustrating
the difference of the conditional
von Neumann entropy H(A|E) and
the conditional collision entropy
H2(A|E) as a function of the
CHSH violation β.
Other Bell inequalities and the min-entropy estimation: The use of different Bell
inequalities has proved to be advantageous in different taks. For example, a tilted
CHSH inequality was used to certify maximal randomness in states arbitrarily close
to separable [110], and inequalities with more inputs and outputs have shown to
exhibit higher noise robustness [111]. Therefore it is natural to ask whether other
Bell inequalities can also bring advantage to the task of device-independent quantum
key distribution.
By considering an arbitrary Bell inequality, one faces the problem that the
techniques used to bound the conditional von Neumann entropy as a function of the
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CHSH violation do not apply. Indeed, the proof of Lemma 2 is highly based on the fact
that one can reduce the analysis to qubits. In fact, very few results are known on tight
bounds for the conditional von Neumann entropy as a function of the Bell violation for
other inequalities. In [112] a bound was derived for a family of inequalities denoted
measurement-device-dependent inequalities [113], which are very suitable for the task
of randomness amplification. In [114] a tight bound was derived as a function of the
violation of the multipartite MABK inequality [115–117]. However in these two cases
the proof is based on a reduction to the CHSH inequality.
In general, the conditional von Neumann entropy can be lower bounded by the
conditional min-entropy
H(A|E)ρ ≥ Hmin(A|E)ρ. (38)
The advantage of looking at the conditional min-entropy is that it can be computed
as a function of the Bell violation by a semi-definite programming [109]. The idea is
that in order to estimate the min-entropy one can upper bound the guessing probability,
pguess (see Eq. (13)), of the eavesdropper. This problem can then be expressed as an
optimization over probability distributions, which is exactly the information available
in the device-independent scenario. As shown in Ref. [109], for any Bell inequality, an
upper bound on the pguess can be obtained by a semidefinite programming making use
of the NPA-hierarchy [118,119].
Lower bounding the conditional von-Neumann entropy by the min-entropy might
be far from optimal. For example, for the CHSH inequality we have that the conditional
von Neumann entropy as a function of the violation is much larger than the conditional
min-entropy, as illustrated in Fig. 7 (recall that, in Theorem 9, Hmin(A|E)ρ was shown
to be a tight bound on H2(A|E)ρ as a function of the CHSH violation). By making use
of the tight bound on the conditional von Neumann entropy, eq. (34), one can prove
security for DIQKD up to 7.1% of QBER [16], whereas using the min-entropy, eq. (36),
security can only be guaranteed up to a QBER of 5.2% [109].
It is still an open problem whether any other Bell inequality can lead to better
performance for DIQKD than the CHSH inequality. Recently, an extensive analysis of
the performance of different Bell inequalities for the task of randomness expansion was
presented in [120].
4.3.3. Key rates. The techniques presented in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 allows us to
establish the length of a secure key that can be extracted as a function of the CHSH
violation β and QBER Q.
For coherent attacks, the entropy accumulation theorem (Theorem 8) and the tight
lower bound on the conditional von Neumann entropy (Lemma 2) are the key tools to
establish Theorem 1. The complete proof of Theorem 1 includes several intermediate
steps, and is presented in details in Appendix B.3.
For collective attacks, the key ingredients to derive Theorem 2 are the asymptotic
equipartition property (Theorem 7) and Lemma 2. A detailed proof of Theorem 2 is
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presented in Appendix B.1. We have also presented a different technique of breaking the
entropy of Alice’s string into the entropy of single rounds in the IID scenario, namely by
making use use of the additivity of 2-Re´yni entropy, Lemma 1. This technique, together
with Theorem 9 leads to Theorem 3. A detailed proof of Theorem 3 can be found in
Appendix B.2.
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Appendix A. Definitions
In this Appendix we present some properties of the conditional sandwiched α-Re´yni
entropies [104], Definition 4, and the smoothed entropies that are used for the security
proof.
Properties 1. The conditional α-Re´nyi entropies satisfy:
(i) Data processing ( [102] Corollary 5.1): Let τAB′ = IA ⊗ EB(ρAB), where EB is a
CPTP(B,B′) channel, then
Hα(A|B)ρ ≤ Hα(A|B′)τ and H↑α(A|B)ρ ≤ H↑α(A|B′)τ . (A.1)
(ii) Additivity ( [102] Corollary 5.2): For ρAB ⊗ τA′B′ it holds that
H↑α(AA
′|BB′)ρ⊗τ = H↑α(A|B)ρ +H↑α(A′|B′)τ . (A.2)
(iii) Entropy of classical information( [102] Lemma 5.3): For ρABX classical in
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X
Hα(XA|B)ρ ≥ Hα(A|B)ρ and H↑α(XA|B)ρ ≥ H↑α(A|B)ρ. (A.3)
(iv) Conditioning on classical information (see [102] Lemma 5.4): For ρABX
classical in X,
H↑α(A|XB) ≥ H↑α(A|B)− log (rank(ρX)) (A.4)
≥ H↑α(A|B)− log |X|, (A.5)
where rank(ρX) is the rank of matrix ρX and |X| is the dimension of system X.
(v) Conditioning on classical information (see [102] Proposition 5.1): Let
ρABX =
∑
x pxρ
x
AB ⊗ |x〉〈x| then,
Hα(A|BX)ρ = 1
1− α log
(∑
x
p(X = x)2((1−α)Hα(A|BX=x)ρ)
)
, (A.6)
H↑α(A|BX)ρ =
α
1− α log
(∑
x
p(X = x)2(
1−α
α
H↑α(A|BX=x)ρ)
)
. (A.7)
And for the conditional von Neumann it holds that
H(A|BX)ρ =
∑
x
p(X = x)H(A|BX = x)ρ. (A.8)
(vi) Entropy of the conditioned state (see [52] Lemma B.5): Let ρABX =∑
x pxρAB|x then,
H↑α(A|B)ρAB|x ≥ H↑α(A|B)ρ −
α
α− 1 log
(
1
px
)
. (A.9)
In Property 1.(iv), the relation H↑α(A|XB) ≥ H↑α(A|B)−log |X| was stated in [102].
We remark that the middle inequality follows from the fact that H↑α(A|XB) is invariant
under local isometries. Therefore if X ′ = V(X) is a full rank operator where V(·) is an
isometry, we have that
H↑α(A|XB) = H↑α(A|X ′B) ≥ H↑α(A|B)− log |X ′| (A.10)
and since V(·) is an isometry |X ′| = rank(ρX).
The min- and max- entropy are the particular extreme cases of H↑α for α =∞ and
α = 1
2
respectively. For α → 1 one recovers the standard conditional von-Neumann
entropy. The smoothed min- and max-entropies are defined as an optimization over
operators that are -close, in the purified distance, to the state of interest. This
optimization takes into account also operators that are sub-normalized, i.e. positive
operators with trace smaller than 1.
Definition 7 (Smoothed entropies [102]). Let ρAB be a quantum state and  ≥ 0. The
smooth min-entropy of system A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ = max
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜. (A.11)
The smooth max-entropy is
Hmax(A|B)ρ = min
ρ˜AB∈B(ρAB)
Hmax(A|B)ρ˜. (A.12)
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In Definition 7, B(ρAB) is an -ball of sub-normalized operators around state ρAB
defined in terms of the purified distance.
Definition 8 (Purified distance [102]). For sub-normalized positive operators X and Y ,
i.e. X, Y ≥ 0 and Tr(X) ≤ 1,Tr(Y ) ≤ 1, the purified distance is given by
D(X, Y ) =
√
1− F∗(X, Y ), (A.13)
where F∗(·, ·) is the generalized fidelity, defined as
F∗(X, Y ) =
(
Tr |
√
X
√
Y |+
√
(1− Tr ρ)(1− Tr(Y ))
)2
. (A.14)
The smoothed entropies satisfy several chain rules. Some of them are stated below.
A more complete list of chain rule relations can be found in [102,121].
Properties 2 (Chain rules for the smooth min-entropy). The smooth min-entropy
satisfy the following relations
(i) For a quantum state ρABC,
Hmin(A|BC)ρ ≥ H

4
min(AB|C)ρ −H

4
max(B|C)ρ (A.15)
− 2 log
1−
√
1−
(

4
)2 .
(ii) If X is a classical register and ρABX a quantum-quantum-classical state, it holds
that††
Hmin(A|XB)ρ ≥ Hmin(A|B)ρ − log (rank(ρX)) , (A.16)
where rank(ρX) is the rank of state ρX .
A fully contained overview with properties and relations between different entropies
can be found in [102] (see also, [122]).
Appendix B. Security proof
According to Definition 5, a security proof of a DIQKD protocol consists in completeness
and soundness. We start by proving completeness of Protocols 1 and 2.
Theorem 10 (Completeness). The DIQKD protocols in consideration, Protocols 1 and
2 are cDIQKD complete, with
cDIQKD ≤ cEC + est + EC . (B.1)
Proof. The protocols in consideration can abort in two steps. Either because the error
correction fail, or because the estimated Bell violation is not high enough. Let us
†† In [102] relation Hmin(A|XB)ρ ≥ Hmin(A|B)ρ − log |X| was proved. Relation (A.16) with the rank
of ρX follows as pointed out in Property 1.(iv).
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consider an honest implementation consisting of IID rounds where the expected winning
CHSH probability is ωexp.
p(abort) = p((EC abort) or (EC does not abort and Bell test fail))
≤ p(EC abort) + p(EC does not abort and Bell test fail)
Now, the probability that the error correction protocol abort for an honest
implementation is p(EC abort) ≤ cEC . And for the other term we have
p(EC does not abort and Bell test fail)
= p(KA = KB)p(
∑
i
Ci <
∑
i
Ti × (ωexp − δest) |KA = KB)
+ p(KA 6= KB)p(
∑
i
Ci <
∑
i
Ti × (ωexp − δest) |KA 6= KB)
≤ est + EC ,
where est = e
−2γn(δest)2 follows from Hoeffding’s inequality.
For the soundness proof we have to evaluate correctness and secrecy, Definitions 1
and 2. For an error correction protocol with error parameter EC we have that given
that the error correction protocol does not abort, the probability that the string B˜ after
error correction is equal to An1 with probability higher than 1− EC and consequently
P (KA 6= KB) ≤ EC . (B.2)
For the secrecy let us recall that, for each considered Protocol, Ω is defined as
the event that the respective protocols do not abort. That happens when the error
correction protocol does not abort and they achieved the required violation of CHSH
according to Bob’s estimation of Alice’s string. Now, let us the define the event Ωˆ as
the event Ω of the Protocol not aborting and the error correction being successful, i.e.
B˜n1 = A
n
1 . Now the quantity we need to estimate for the secrecy, relates to the event Ωˆ
by
‖ρKAE |Ω − τKA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ‖ρKAE |Ω − ρKAE |Ωˆ‖1 + ‖ρKAE |Ωˆ − τKA ⊗ ρE‖1
≤ EC + ‖ρKAE |Ωˆ − τKA ⊗ ρE‖1 (B.3)
which follows from the fact that, since when error correction succeeds, the probability
of B˜n1 = A
n
1 is higher than (1 − EC) then the following operator inequality holds:
ρKAE |Ω ≥ (1− EC)ρKAE |Ωˆ.
In the following, we proceed to evaluate ‖ρKAE |Ωˆ − τKA ⊗ ρE‖1 in order to prove
Theorems 1, 2 and 3.
Appendix B.1. Proof of Theorem 2
In this Appendix we present the proof of Theorem 2, that determines the size of a
secret key one can extract from Protocol 2 under the assumption that the eavesdropper
is restricted to collective attacks. Importantly, Theorem 2 is based on the asymptotic
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equipartition property, Theorem 7, in order to break the entropy of the n rounds into
the one-round entropy.
The collective attacks assumption implies that in each round of the protocol the
state distributed to Alice and Bob is the same, as well as their devices function in the
same way, i.e. the rounds are independent and identically distributed (IID). Therefore
the state shared between Alice, Bob and Eve after Alice and Bob measure their raw
keys is described by a tensor product form ρ⊗nABE.
The asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [61], Theorem 7, states that the
smooth min-entropy of a tensor product of states is almost equivalent (up to terms of
order of
√
n) to n times the von-Neumann entropy of an individual system. We now
make use of the quantum AEP to derive the length of a secure key that one can achieve
for Protocol 2.
As established by the leftover hashing lemma, Theorem 5, the maximal length of a
secure key is determined by the smooth min-entropy of Alice’s raw key conditioned on
all information available to the eavesdropper, given that the protocol did not abort. In
the case of Protocol 2, it is given by
H
s
p(Ω)
min (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 EOEC)ρ|Ωˆ . (B.4)
Here we recall that OEC is the information exchanged by Alice and Bob during the error
correction protocol. T n1 , X
n
1 , Y
n
1 are, respectively, the variable that determines whether
the round is a test or a key generation round, and Alice and Bob’s inputs, which are
communicated publicly. Ωˆ is the event that error correction protocol succeeds, i.e.
KA = KB and the CHSH probability estimated by Bob is ω ≥ ωexp − δest. In the
following we describe the steps to estimate (B.4).
In order to avoid the conditioned state we can give one step back and note that in
Definition 2 we want to bound
p(Ωˆ)‖ρKAHE|Ωˆ − τKA ⊗ ρHE|Ωˆ‖1 = ‖ρKAHE∧Ωˆ − τKA ⊗ ρHE∧Ωˆ‖1 (B.5)
where ρKAHE∧Ωˆ = p(Ωˆ)ρKAHE|Ωˆ. Now using the Leftover Hashing Lemma, Theorem 5,
we can express an (PA + s)-secret key by
l = Hsmin(A
n
1 |E)ρ∧Ω − 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
. (B.6)
Now we make use of the fact that the smooth-min-entropy of the conditioned state is
lower bounded by the smooth-min-entropy of the state without conditioning, as proved
in Ref. [11, Lemma 10]
Hsmin(A
n
1 |E)ρ∧Ω ≥ Hsmin(An1 |E)ρ. (B.7)
In the following we proceed to estimate the quantity
Hsmin(A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 EOEC)ρ. (B.8)
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Step 1: Accounting for the leakage in the error correction.
Using the chain rule relation for the smooth min-entropy conditioned on classical
information, Property 2(ii), we have
Hsmin(A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 EOEC)ρ ≥ Hsmin(An1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ − leakEC , (B.9)
where leakEC = rank(ρOEC) represents the minimum amount of classical information
that needs to be communicated from Alice to Bob in order to perform error correction†.
We consider that Alice and Bob use a protocol based on universal hashing which has
minimum leakage [123]. In [124] it was proved that the minimum leakage is given by
leakEC ≤ H
′
EC
0 (A
n
1 |Bn1Xn1 Y n1 T n1 ) + log
(
1
EC
)
, (B.10)
where, if Alice and Bob do not abort, then KA = KB with probability at least 1− EC .
And for an honest implementation, the error correction protocol aborts with probability
at most cEC = 
′
EC + EC . Here H0 is a Re´nyi entropy first introduced in Ref. [49] (in
Ref. [102], it is denoted H¯↑0 ). The entropy H

0, relates to the smooth max-entropy in the
following way [106, Lemma 18],
H
′EC
0 (A
n
1 |Bn1Xn1 Y n1 T n1 ) ≤ H
′
EC
2
max (An1 |Bn1Xn1 Y n1 T n1 ) (B.11)
+ log
(
8
′2EC
+
2
2− ′EC
)
.
We now can use of the asymptotic equipartition property, Theorem 7, to decompose
(B.11) into the sum of the entropy of single rounds. Moreover, for an honest
implementation with winning CHSH probability ωexp and QBER Q we have that
for the test rounds H(A|BXY T = 1) = h(ωexp) and for the key generation rounds
H(A|BXY T = 0) = h(Q). Therefore the one round entropy is given by
H(A|BXY T ) = p(T = 0)H(A|BXY T = 0) + p(T = 1)H(A|BXY T = 1)
= (1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp), (B.12)
where in the first equality we have use Property 1(v).
Therefore, the leakage due to error correction is given by
leakEC ≤ n((1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)) +
√
n
(
4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
log
8
′2EC
)
+ log
(
8
′2EC
+
2
2− ′EC
)
+ log
(
1
EC
)
. (B.13)
It is not known if an efficient error correction protocol can achieve the minimum
leakage estimated in Eq. (B.13), and practical implementations may use protocols with
higher leakage. Ref. [125] analyses the leakage in error correction for concrete protocols,
based on state-of-the-art error correcting codes, with efficient implementation. A more
realistic analysis of the error correction leakage should take into account an specific
code.
† Note that in a realistic implementation Alice might send the error correction information using an
encoding in order to overcome errors in the transmission due to channel losses. Therefore, in general
ρOEC may not be full rank.
Towards a realization of device-independent quantum key distribution 45
Step 2: Breaking the entropy into single rounds.
We now can use the asymptotic equipartition property in order to bound
Hsmin(A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ. The assumption of collective attacks implies that the state under
consideration has the tensor product form and therefore
Hsmin(A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ ≥ nH(A|XY TE)ρ −
√
nδ(s, η), (B.14)
where δ(s, η) and η are specified in Theorem 7.
For the scenario under consideration we have
η ≤ 2
√
2Hmax(A|XY TE)ρ + 1 ≤ 2
√
2 + 1. (B.15)
The first inequality follows from the fact that A is a classical register and
therefore has positive conditional min-entropy, which implies −Hmin(A|XY TE)ρ ≤
Hmin(A|XY TE)ρ ≤ Hmax(A|XY TE)ρ. The second inequality follows from the fact
that since A is a binary variable Hmax(A|XY TE)ρ ≤ 1. Therefore,
δ(s, η) ≤ 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√√√√log( 2
2s
)
. (B.16)
Step 3: Estimating the one-round entropy.
Now it only remains to lower bound H(A|XY TE)ρ. Lemma 2 states the tight lower
bound for the conditional von-Neumann entropy as a function of the winning probability
ω for the CHSH game derived in [16, 39]. Using this bound we have that if ρ is a state
that achieves winning probability ω then
H(A|XY TE)ρ ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω(ω − 1) + 3
)
. (B.17)
Now, Protocol 2 aborts if the observed frequency of winning events is smaller than
ωexp − δest. Therefore, given the event Ωˆ that Protocol 2 does not abort and KA = KB,
we have that Alice and Bob observe a violation higher than ωexp− δest. Now we need to
take into account that the CHSH violation is estimated with a finite number of rounds.
So in order to infer the real winning probability ω∗ of the IID implementation, we
can make use of the Hoeffding’s inequality in order to define a confidence interval: If
ω∗ < ωexp − δest − δcon then
Prob (ωobserved ≥ ωexp − δest) ≤ e−2γn(δcon)2 := con. (B.18)
Therefore, given that Alice and Bob do not abort the protocol, we infer that the expected
winning probability of the system under consideration is higher than ωexp − δest − δcon,
and therefore
H(A|XY TE)ρ ≥ (B.19)
1− h
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
16(ωexp − δest − δcon)((ωexp − δest − δcon)− 1) + 3
)
.
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Putting the results of these steps together we have that either Protocol 2 aborts
with probability higher than 1 − (con + EC), or the probability of aborting is smaller
than (con+ EC) and a (2EC + s+ PA)-correct-and-secret key can be generated of size
l ≥ n
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16(ωexp − δest − δcon)((ωexp − δest − δcon)− 1) + 3
)
− (1− γ)h(Q)− γh(ωexp)
]
(B.20)
−√n
(
4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)(√
log
2
2s
+
√
log
8
′2EC
))
− log
(
8
′2EC
+
2
2− ′EC
)
− log
(
1
EC
)
− 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
.
This establishes Theorem 2.
Appendix B.2. Proof of Theorem 3
We now present the proof of Theorem 3, that determines the size of a secret key one
can extract from Protocol 2 for collective attacks, but differently from Theorem 2, we
now use the additivity property of the 2-Re´nyi entropy, Lemma 1, in order to break the
entropy of the string into the one-round entropy.
We are now interested in estimate the length of a secure key as established in
Theorem 4, which is given by
H↑2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 EOEC)ρ|Ωˆ . (B.21)
As in Appendix B.1 we now present the steps that lead to the proof of Theorem 3.
Step 1: Accounting for the leakage in the Error Correction.
Using Property 1(v), we have
H↑2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 EOEC)ρ|Ωˆ ≥ H
↑
2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ|Ωˆ − leakEC , (B.22)
where leakEC = rank(ρOEC) represents the minimum amount of classical information
that needs to be communicated from Alice to Bob in order to perform error correction.
Now the error correction leakage leakEC is the same as derived in Equation (B.13).
Step 2: Breaking the entropy into single rounds.
We first use Property 1(v) in order to express the entropy of the state conditioned on
the event Ωˆ in terms of the entropy of the unconditioned state
H↑2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ|Ωˆ ≥ H
↑
2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ − 2 log
(
1
pΩˆ
)
. (B.23)
We can now make use the additivity property of 2-Re´yni entropy, Lemma 1, in
order to bound H↑2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ. The assumption of collective attacks implies that
the state under consideration has the tensor product form and therefore
H↑2 (A
n
1 |Xn1 Y n1 T n1 E)ρ ≥ nH2(A|XY TE)ρ, (B.24)
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where now the single round entropy in consideration is the conditional collision entropy.
Step 3: Estimating the one-round entropy.
Now it only remains to lower bound H2(A|XY TE)ρ. Theorem 9 shows that a tight lower
bound for the conditional collision entropy as a function of the violation β coincides with
the previously derived conditional min-entropy [109], eq.(36). Therefore, for a state ρ
that wins the CHSH game with probability ω
H2(A|XY TE)ρ ≥ − log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω(1− ω)− 2
)
. (B.25)
Now, either the expected winning probability of the system under consideration is
smaller than ωexp− δest− δcon, in which case the protocol aborts with probability higher
than 1 − (con + EC), or pΩˆ > con + EC which implies that the system has winning
probability larger than ωexp − δest − δcon, and
H2(A|XY TE)ρ ≥ (B.26)
− log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16(ωexp − δest − δcon)(1− (ωexp − δest − δcon))− 2
)
.
In conclusion we have that, either Protocol 2 aborts with probability higher than
1 − (con + EC), or the probability of not aborting is greater than (con + EC) and a
(2EC + PA)-correct-and-secret key is generated of size:
l ≥ n
[
− log
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16(ωexp − δest − δcon)(1− (ωexp − δest − δcon))− 2
)
− (1− γ)h(Q)− γh(ωexp)
]
(B.27)
−√n
(
4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
log
8
′2EC
)
− log
(
8
′2EC
+
2
2− ′EC
)
(B.28)
− log
(
1
EC
)
− 2 log
(
1
2PA
)
−2 log
(
1
con + EC
)
.
This establishes Theorem 3.
Appendix B.3. Proof of Theorem 1
In this Appendix we present the proof of Theorem 1, which establishes the size of a
secure key that can be extracted from Protocol 1 for general coherent attacks. We
follow closely the proof developed in [1, 39].
In Protocol 1, the number of rounds is not fixed. Instead, Protocol 1 has a fixed
number of blocks m, such that the maximum number of rounds inside a block is set to
smax =
⌈
1
γ
⌉
. This is a technicality introduced in [1,39] in order to get a better pre-factor
for the overhead terms that scale with
√
n. For each block j Alice and Bob run the
protocol until they have a test round or they reach the maximum number of rounds smax.
At each round ji Alice and Bob choose a random bit Tji , such that P (Tji = 1) = γ,
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which determines whether they are going to test the CHSH inequality or make a key
generation round. They repeat the process until they obtain Tji = 1 or i = smax. With
these constraints the expected number of rounds in a block is given by
s¯ =
1− (1− γ)d 1γe
γ
, (B.29)
and the expected number of rounds is
n = ms¯. (B.30)
For details on the derivation of equations (B.29) and (B.30) see Ref. [39, Appendix B]
We now proceed to derive the key rates against a general coherent attack. In order
to calculate the size of the key we need to estimate
H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 EO)ρ|Ωˆ . (B.31)
Now ~Am1 denotes the total string of bits, expected to be of size n, and ~Ai denotes the
string of outputs generated in the block i, and similarly for the other variables. In the
following, we proceed step by step in order to lower bound H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 EO)ρ|Ωˆ
and we detail the changes introduced to the original analysis [1, 39].
Step 1: Accounting for the leakage in the error correction.
Similar to the proof of Protocol 2, we have that
H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 EO)ρ|Ωˆ ≥ H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ − leakEC ,(B.32)
and
leakEC ≤ H
′
EC
0 ( ~A
m
1 | ~Bm1 ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 ) + log
(
1
EC
)
(B.33)
≤ H
′
EC
2
max ( ~Am1 | ~Bm1 ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 ) (B.34)
+ log
(
8
′EC
2 +
2
(2− ′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
EC
)
.
However, now we need to take into account for the fact that the number of rounds in
the protocol is not fixed. Following the steps of Ref. [39], we first note that the number
of rounds N obtained in an implementation of the Protocol 1 satisfies:
P [N ≥ n+ t] ≤ exp
(
− 2t
2γ2
m(1− γ)2
)
:= t, (B.35)
where n = ms¯ is the expected number of rounds and t =
√
−m(1−γ)2 log t
2γ2
. Moreover, by
the definition of smooth max-entropy one have that
Hmax( ~A
m
1 | ~Bm1 ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 N) ≤ H−
√
t
max ( ~A
m
1 | ~Bm1 ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 N ≤ n+ t).(B.36)
Note that N can be included in the entropy since it is completely determined by ~Tm1 .
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Now applying the asymptotic equipartition property, Theorem 7, to the maximal
length N = n+ t we have
leakEC ≤ (n¯+ t) · [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)]
+
√
n¯+ t ν2 + log
(
8
′EC
2 +
2
(2− ′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
EC
)
,
where ν2 = 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√√√√2 log( 8
(′EC−2
√
t)
2
)
and t is a free parameter to be
optimised.
If the error correction protocol does not abort, then
P (KA 6= KB) ≤ EC . (B.37)
And the completeness of the error correction protocol (i.e., the probability of not
aborting in an honest IID implementation) is given by cEC = 
′
EC + EC .
Step 2: Chain rule.
In Protocol 1, a statistical test is performed on the variable Ci which accounts for the
condition of winning the CHSH game being satisfied or not. In order to use the entropy
accumulation theorem, we need to be able to infer the value of this variable Ci from the
variables that appear in the smooth min-entropy we are calculating.
Here we choose to use a chain rule, relation (A.15), with the variable Ci itself, as
opposed to using the variable Bi as is done in [39]. The reason is that the dimension of
the variable Ci is smaller than Bi, as for each block the variable Ci assumes one out of
three values. This leads to a slight improvement in rates achieved in the finite regime:
H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ ≥ H
s
4p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 C
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ
−H
s
4p(Ω)
max (Cm1 | ~Am1 ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ (B.38)
− 3 log
1−
√√√√1− ( s
4p(Ω)
)2
≥ H
s
4p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 C
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ
−H
s
4p(Ω)
max (Cm1 |~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ (B.39)
− 3 log
1−
√√√√1− ( s
4(EA + EC)
)2 .
In inequality (B.39) we use the fact that p(Ω) ≥ (EA + EC) and that removing the
conditioning on classical variables can only increase the entropy, which can be seen as
a particular case of data processing, Property 1(i).
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Step 3: Upper bound on H
s
4p(Ω)
max (Cm1 |~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ.
We can use the entropy accumulation theorem to upper bound H
s
4p(Ω)
max (Cm1 |~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ . In
order to do that we only have to find a max-tradeoff function for a protocol with m
rounds. We have that for any distribution ~p = (p(1), p(0), p(⊥)) of the variable C:
H(Ci|~TiE)ρ|Ωˆ = p(~Ti = ~0)H(Ci|~Ti = ~0E)ρ|Ωˆ (B.40)
+ p(~Ti 6= ~0)H(Ci|~Ti 6= ~0E)ρ|Ωˆ
= p(~Ti 6= ~0)H(Ci|~Ti 6= ~0E)ρ|Ωˆ (B.41)
≤ h
(
p(1)
1− p(⊥)
)
= h
(
p(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
)
= h(ω), (B.42)
where in (B.41) we use the fact that H(Ci|~Ti = ~0E) = 0, and in (B.42) we use that
p(~Ti 6= ~0) ≤ 1 and that p(1)1−(1−γ)smax ≡ ω. Note that h(·) is a concave function.
Now we can take fmax = h(ωexp − δest) and ‖∇fmax‖∞ = 11−(1−γ)smax × ∂h∂ω
∣∣∣
ωexp−δest
,
where ωexp is the expected winning probability of the CHSH game in an honest
implementation and δest accounts for the statistical confidence interval of the experiment.
Using the entropy accumulation theorem, Theorem 8, we have
H
s
4p(Ω)
max (Cm1 |~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ ≤ mh(ωexp − δest) +
√
mν1 (B.43)
where
ν1 = 2
(
log 7 +
⌈ |h′(ωexp + δest)|
1− (1− γ)smax
⌉)√
1− 2 log s, (B.44)
and h′ represents the derivative of the binary entropy function, ∂h(ω)
∂ω
.
Step 4: Lower bound on H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 C
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ.
Finally, we apply the entropy accumulation theorem to lower bound the term
H
s
p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 C
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ . Therefore we need to find a min-tradeoff function such
that
fmin(~q) ≤ inf
σRj−1E :Mj(σ)Cj=~q
H( ~AjCj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjE)Mj(σ) (B.45)
Note that the length of each block is variable. However, we can consider that all
the blocks have size smax and set all the variables to ⊥ for the rounds which are not
performed.
First note that
H( ~AjCj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjE) ≥ H( ~Aj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjE). (B.46)
And from now on, we follow the same steps as Ref. [39].
Using the chain-rule for Von Neuman, Property 1(v), entropy we have
H( ~Aj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjE) =
smax∑
i=1
H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjEAj i−11 ). (B.47)
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and for every i ∈ [smax],
H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjEAj i−11 ) =
= p(Tj
i−1
1 =
~0)H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~YjEAj i−11 Tjsmaxi , Tj i−11 = ~0) (B.48)
+ p(Tj
i−1
1 6= ~0)H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~YjEAj i−11 Tjsmaxi , Tj i−11 6= ~0)
= (1− γ)(i−1)H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~YjEAj i−11 Tjsmaxi , Tj i−11 = ~0), (B.49)
where we used the fact that H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~YjEAj i−11 Tjsmaxi , Tj i−11 6= ~0) = 0. Therefore
H( ~Aj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjE) = (B.50)
smax∑
i=1
(1− γ)(i−1)H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~YjEAj i−11 Tjsmaxi , Tj i−11 = ~0).
Each term H(Aj,i| ~Xj ~YjEAj i−11 Tjsmaxi , Tj i−11 = ~0) can be seen as the entropy of a single
round. An expression for the entropy of a single round was derived for collective attacks
in [16]. This gives us:
H( ~AjCj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjE) = (B.51)
smax∑
i=1
(1− γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi(ωi − 1) + 3
)]
such that
p(1) =
smax∑
i=1
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi. (B.52)
Now, in [39] it is proved that the minimum of (B.51) is achieved for
ω∗i =
p(1)
1− (1− γ)smax ∀i, (B.53)
and therefore we have a min-tradeoff function:
g(~p) = s
[
1− h
(
1
2
+ 1
2
√
16 p(1)
1−(1−γ)smax
(
p(1)
1−(1−γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
; (B.54)
for p(1)
1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
3
4
, 2+
√
2
4
]
.
Note that as p(1) → ((1 − (1 − γ)smax)2+
√
2
4
, the gradient of g(~p) tends to infinity,
which compromises the
√
n term that depends on the norm of the gradient of f . Since
g(~p) is a convex function, the tangent line in any point ~pt is a lower bound to g(~p).
Therefore, as in [1, 39], we take the min-tradeoff function to be a tangent g in a point
~pt to be optimized†:
Fmin(p, pt) =
d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣∣
p˜t
· p(1) +
(
g(pt)− d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣∣
pt
· pt(1)
)
. (B.55)
† In [1, 39] the authors consider the following min-tradeoff function
fmin(~p) =
{
g(~p) if pt(1) > p(1)
Fmin(~p, ~pt) = if pt(1) ≤ p(1)
.
We remark that, since the gradient of g(~p) is an increasing function of p(1), the optimum value for ηopt
is always achieved for pt(1) ≤ p(1).
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Then we have
H
s
4p(Ω)
min ( ~A
m
1 C
m
1 | ~Xm1 ~Y m1 ~Tm1 E)ρ|Ωˆ > m · ηopt =
n¯
s¯
· ηopt, (B.56)
where
ηopt = max
3
4
<
p˜t(1)
1−(1−γ)smax <
2+
√
2
4
[
Fmin(p˜, p˜t)− 1√
m
ν3
]
, (B.57)
such that
ν3 = 2
(
log (1 + 2 · 2smax3) +
⌈
d
dp(1)
g(p˜)|pt
⌉)√
1− 2 log s. (B.58)
Finally, the length of a secure key that can be extracted is given by
l ≥ n¯
s¯
ηopt − n¯
s¯
h(ωexp − δest)−
√
n¯
s¯
ν1
− (n¯+ t) · [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] (B.59)
−√n¯+ t ν2 − log
(
8
′EC
2 +
2
(2− ′EC)
)
− log
(
1
EC
)
− 3 log
1−
√
1−
(
s
4
)2− 2 log( 1
2PA
)
.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 9
Theorem 9. There exist a state ρ∗AB and measurements for Alice and Bob such that,
ρ∗AB achieves violation β and the collision entropy of Alice’s output A conditioned on
Eve’s quantum information E is
H2(A|E)ρ∗ = − log
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− β
2
4
 . (C.1)
Proof. The proof consists in exhibiting a state ρ∗AB and measurements for Alice and Bob
such that the lower bound given by eq.(36) is saturated. Our derivation is based on the
techniques presented in Ref. [16], which led to a tight lower bound for the conditional
von-Neumann entropy.
Let us consider that Alice and Bob share a Bell diagonal state ρAB
ρAB = λ00Φ00 + λ01Φ01 + λ10Φ10 + λ11Φ11 (C.2)
where Φij = |Φij〉〈Φij| and |Φij〉 = I ⊗ X iZj
(
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
)
. We first prove the
following result:
Lemma 3. For a Bell-diagonal state where Alice performs a measurement in the Z-basis
we have that
H2(A|XY E)ρ ≥ − log
(
1
2
+
√
λ00λ01 +
√
λ11λ10
)
. (C.3)
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Proof. Given a Bell diagonal state ρAB(λ00, λ01, λ10, λ11), a purification |Ψ〉ABE of this
state is given by
|Ψ〉ABE =
√
λ00 |Φ00〉AB |e1〉E +
√
λ01 |Φ01〉AB |e2〉E (C.4)
+
√
λ10 |Φ10〉AB |e3〉E +
√
λ11 |Φ11〉AB |e4〉E .
After Alice measures in the Z basis we have
ρAE =
1
2
|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE|0 + 1
2
|1〉〈1| ⊗ ρE|1 (C.5)
where
ρE|0 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ |ψ2〉〈ψ2| and ρE|1 = |ψ3〉〈ψ3|+ |ψ4〉〈ψ4| , (C.6)
with non-normalized states
|ψ1〉 =
(√
λ00 |e1〉+
√
λ01 |e2〉
)
,
|ψ2〉 =
(√
λ10 |e3〉+
√
λ11 |e4〉
)
,
|ψ3〉 =
(√
λ10 |e3〉 −
√
λ11 |e4〉
)
,
|ψ4〉 =
(√
λ00 |e1〉 −
√
λ01 |e2〉
)
.
The collision entropy of a cq-state ρAE is given by
H2(A|E)ρ = − log Tr
(
ρ
−1/2
E ρAEρ
−1/2
E ρAE
)
, (C.7)
which, evaluated for the state (C.5) gives
H2(A|E)ρ = − log
(
1
2
+
(√
λ00
√
λ01 +
√
λ10
√
λ11
))
.
Now let us consider a Bell diagonal state ρ∗AB such that
λ00 = R cos θ, λ01 = R sin θ, λ10 = λ11 = 0, (C.8)
s.t. cos θ + sin θ =
1
R
which can hold for R > 1√
2
. This choice is inspired by the optimal strategy that
maximizes the conditional von Neumann entropy as shown in [16].
For these parameters we have that
H2(A|XY E)ρ∗ ≥ − log
1
2
+R
√
1
2
(
1
R2
− 1
) (C.9)
Finally, we know from [126] that for a state ρAB(λ00, λ01, λ10, λ11), the maximal
violation βmax of the CHSH inequality is given by
βmax = max
{
2
√
2
√
(λ00 − λ11)2 + (λ01 − λ10)2, (C.10)
2
√
2
√
(λ00 − λ10)2 + (λ01 − λ11)2
}
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and that this violation can be achieved with one of Alice’s measurement being in the Z
basis.
Therefore, for the state ρ∗AB, specified by (C.8), and Alice and Bob performing the
measurements that gives the maximum violation achievable for the CHSH inequality,
we have that β = 2
√
2R. This implies
H2(A|XY E)ρ∗ = − log
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− β
4
 . (C.11)
